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SUPREME COURT, U.S.

IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

OCTOBER TERM 1978

NO. 78-6095

LARRY GRIFFITH,

Petitioner,

against,

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Respondent.

IN PROPRIA PERSONA

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT

Prepared by;

Richard R. Sauter, Esq.
Jailhouse Lawyer
Arizona State Prison
P.O. Box B 32610
Florence, Arizona 85232

Name Larry Griffith
P.O. Box B 32639
Florence, Arizona 85232

In Propria Persona

I

JURISDICTION

This courts jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1257.

II

OPINION BELOW

Petitioners application for Special Action was denied on the 9 day of JAN, 1978 (without an evidentiary hearing). The order denying said application is attached hereto as Appendix A.

III

QUESTION PRESENTED

WHETHER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 14th AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION EXTENDS TO PAROLE RELEASE DETERMINATIONS AND, IF SO, WHETHER THE SAFEGUARDS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE UNDER APPLICABLE ARIZONA LAW CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE?

IV

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. CONSTITUTION:

14th Amendment.

ARIZONA CONSTITUTION:

Article 2, Section 4.

V

REASON WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED

THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 14th AMENDMENT EXTENDS TO PAROLE DETERMINATIONS IN THAT THE SAFEGUARDS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE UNDER APPLICABLE ARIZONA LAW ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY INADEQUATE.

At the outset it should be noted that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, has succinctly stated, many years ago, that determinations by a parole board cannot be arbitrary, basically unfair, or invidiously discriminatory. The court also made it clear that the time an inmate must serve in prison must be determined in a manner consistant with the federal constitution. STURM v. CALIFORNIA ADULT AUTHORITY, (9th Cir. 1968) U.S. 446, 449, 450.

Other courts holding that due process applies to parole determination hearings are:

1. HILL v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE U.S., (3rd Cir. 1977)

550 F.2d 901.

2. FRONCZAK v. WARDEN, EL RENO REFORMATORY, (10th Cir. 1977) 553 F.2d 1219.

In the present case the petitioner appeared before the parole board on the day of Oct, 1978, at which time his application for parole was denied.

In denying parole the parole board failed to:

(a) give petitioner advance written notice of the factors that the board would consider at the hearing. (see, e.g.- WILLIAMS v. MISSOURI BOARD OF PROBATION & PAROLE, (8th Cir. 1978) 54 C.R.L. 2230.

(b) keep a record of the proceedings that could be reduced to written form in order for petitioner to have proper judicial review.

(c) furnish petitioner with a full and fair explanation of it's reason(s) for denying petitioner parole.

(d) publish and distribute to petitioner it's guidelines (factor/criteria) relied on in parole determination hearing or mandated by administrative procedure Act.

(e) give reasons for parole which do substantially relate to the parole board guidelines, (factor/criteria) if any, they relied on in denying/deciding petitioners application for parole.

(f) advise petitioner of the reason(s) for denial so that he could appropriately adjust his future conduct, to enable him to be granted parole at his next hearing.

Petitioner submits that the above cited failure by the Arizona Parole Board falls within the ambit of; INMATES OF NEBRASKA PENAL AND CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX v. GREENHOLTZ, 23 C.R.L. 2265, 576 F.2d 1274.

VI

CONCLUSION

Because of the foregoing reasons, the Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Copy of the foregoing Pet. for Writ of Cert. mailed this 21st day of January, 1979 to:

Office of the Attorney General
200 State Capitol Building
Phoenix, Arizona 85007

I, Larry Griffith, declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME
THIS 12th DAY OF JAN, 1979

John Ong
NOTARY PUBLIC

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
AUGUST 11, 1982

Respectfully submitted

Larry Griffith

Larry Griffith

Supreme Court

STATE OF ARIZONA

Phoenix

85007

Received 1-12-79
MARY ANN HOPKINS
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

January 10, 1979

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Supreme Court
No. M-241

Respondent,

vs.

LARRY GRIFFITH,

Petitioner.

The following action was taken by the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona
on January 9, 1979 in regard to the above-entitled cause:

"ORDERED: The Court declines to accept jurisdiction
of the Petition for Special Action."

CLIFFORD H. WARD, Clerk

By *Deeley Danley*
Deputy Clerk

TO: Larry Griffith, Arizona State Prison, Box B-32639, Florence,
Arizona 85232
Hon. Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General, 200 State Capitol Building,
Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Attn: Robert F. Ellig
Charles F. Hyder, Maricopa County Attorney, 101 West Jefferson Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85003

APPENDIX 'A'

FEB 21 1979

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

WALTER NODAK, JR., CLERK

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

NO. 78-6095

LARRY GRIFFITH,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ROBERT K. CORBIN
Attorney General

FRED W. STORK, III
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Division
200 State Capitol
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
Counsel for Respondent

February 16, 1979

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1978

NO. 78-6095

LARRY GRIFFITH,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF ARIZONA,
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ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
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Counsel for Respondent

IN THE
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ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

The respondent, State of Arizona, respectfully
requests that this Court deny the petition for
writ of certiorari seeking review of the
Arizona Supreme Court's action in this case.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioner, Larry Griffith, initially filed an original Petition for Special Action in the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona. He filed as an indigent and was not represented by an attorney. Griffith's State Court Petition did not purport to invoke any particular state jurisdictional authority; however, it is apparent that Griffith proceeded under 17A Arizona Revised Statutes, Special Actions, Rules of Procedure. The Arizona Attorney General, on behalf of the State of Arizona, filed a response to Griffith's Petition for Special Action in which the Attorney General asked the State Court to dismiss the petition. On 9 January 1979, the Arizona Supreme Court entered its order declining to accept jurisdiction of the Petition for Special Action. Griffith has filed no other suits before any Arizona court raising the issues presented herein.

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED

Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1257 states in pertinent part:

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:

* * *

(3) By Writ of Certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.

The jurisdictional prerequisite in this case, therefore, is a final judgment or decree from the highest court in Arizona. This court has stated in the past that it will not be bound

by the state's characterization of the finality of the judgment. Cole v. Violette, 319 U.S. 581 (1943); Richfield Oil Corporation v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946). Also, the entire record may be reviewed to determine whether further proceedings may be had. Richfield Oil Corporation v. State Board of Equalization, supra; Local No. 438 Construction and General Laborer's Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963); Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 479 note 8 (1975). However, the requirement that there be a final judgment or decree has been consistently upheld. Richfield Oil Corporation v. State Board of Equalization; Local No. 438 Construction and General Laborer's Union v. Curry; Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn, supra.

There is no final Arizona judgment or decree in this case. The special action procedure in Arizona is the successor in both the trial and appellate courts to the old extraordinary writs of certiorari, mandamus

and prohibition. 17A, Arizona Revised Statutes, Special Actions, Rules of Procedure, Rule 1 states in part:

(a) Relief previously obtained against a body, officer, or person by writs of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition in the trial or appellate courts shall be obtained in an action under this Rule, and any reference in any statute or rule to any of these writs, unless excepted in the next subsection, shall be deemed to refer to the special action authorized under this Rule.

The Arizona Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when a matter is brought to it in an original petition for special action, it will exercise its discretion when deciding whether to grant the petition and thus consider the case on its merits. See Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167, 412 P.2d 463 (1966); Jolly v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 186, 540 P.2d 658 (1975); Nataros v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 498, 557 P.2d 1057 (1976).

In this case the Arizona Supreme Court did not decide the case on the merits. On the contrary, it simply exercised its discretion and decided not to consider the

case on the merits. This does not mean that Griffith was left without any remedy. The question presented in this petition makes it clear that Griffith's underlying objective is to obtain a judgment to the effect that he was denied his right to due process of law at his parole release hearing. The Arizona appellate courts have held that this is an appropriate matter to bring before the Arizona trial courts [superior courts] and that this may be done through a petition for special action. See Foggy v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 108 Ariz. 470, 501 P.2d 942 (1972); State ex rel. State Board of Pardons and Paroles v. Superior Court, 12 Ariz.App. 77, 467 P.2d 917 (1970). Griffith could, therefore, have brought a petition for special action either in the Superior Court for Pinal County which was the county where he was confined or the Superior Court for Maricopa County where the Board of Pardons and Paroles has its offices.

The Arizona Supreme Court's decision not to accept the petition for special action in

this case is not inconsistent with Foggy v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles and State ex rel., State Board of Pardons and Paroles v. Superior Court, supra. Sound principles of judicial administration suggest that where, as in this case, there are issues of fact which must be resolved through testimony the better practice would be to have the case initially considered by a court organized to conduct trials on the facts. There is nothing, either in the Arizona Supreme Court's Order or in the general law of the State of Arizona which would preclude Griffith from raising the issues addressed here in a petition for special action in an appropriate superior court.

It has been said that, "a 'final decision' generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, (1945). The Arizona Supreme Court has not decided that Griffith's rights have been adequately safeguarded under

Arizona law and it has not decided that they have not been adequately safeguarded. Its decision is nothing more than a statement that Griffith chose the wrong forum to initiate his suit. As such, the Arizona Supreme Court's Order is not a final judgment or decree as required by 28 U.S.C.A. 1257. This court, therefore, is without jurisdiction to grant the writ of certiorari.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Robert K. Corbin
Attorney General

Fred W. Stork, III
Assistant Chief Counsel
Civil Division
200 State Capitol
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
Attorneys for Respondent

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NO. 78-6095

LARRY GRIFFITH,
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STATE OF ARIZONA,
Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 16th day of February, 1979, three copies of Respondent's Brief in Opposition on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona were mailed, postage prepaid, to Larry Griffith, P.O. Box B32639, Florence, Arizona 85232, petitioner. I further certify

that all parties required to be served have
been served.

ROBERT K. CORBIN
Attorney General

FRED W. STORK, III
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Division
200 State Capitol
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
Counsel for Respondent